'The historical importance of law to feminism and the women's movement Essay

'The historical importance of law to feminism and the women's movement cannot be under-estimated.' Discuss - Essay Example They began to criticize a system which had relegated them to the household and to the roles of wife and mother, and to demonstrate in support of laws and other measures which would allow them to extend their role, and to prove that they were at least the equals of men. At the same time, they criticized the ideologies which had outlined this restricted role for them, and female academics, in law but also in sociology, history, psychology and other areas, attempted a fundamental revision of existing frameworks which were now held to be inadequate. However, the relationship between feminism and the law is more complex than a consistent attack of the one by the other. Some of the most important breakthroughs for the women’s movement have involved the establishment of legal precedents to ensure that progress is enforceable by law. Nevertheless, it is also true to say that the feminist critique of law has become more comprehensive over time, and what might be called ‘postmoder n’1 feminism has refuted the legitimacy of the basic values which law claims to represent and defend. There is a general consensus, outlined by Naffine2 and Cain3, among others, that the historical links between law, feminism and the women’s movement can be divided into three main phases. In general terms, the first phase was characterised by feminist concerns about the male domination of law and the legal professions, and the ways in which men have operated a legal system designed to uphold the values of their own society and to perpetuate their power. The second phase broadened the attack, with feminists exploring the masculinity and masculine values which informs everything about law, and means that it is unable to take account of female values and experience, and does not operate for their benefit. More recently, feminists have extended this critique further, contending that the key values on which law claims to be based – justice and impartiality, for examp le – are compromised by its exclusion of female experience, so that these values become inherently male values. It is worth exploring each of these phases in more detail. In the first phase of feminist legal critique, from the mid-1960s, the vision of the law as a generally rational and fair institution was not much questioned. The law was seen as an institution currently monopolised by men, but prime territory for women to critique and infiltrate, so that the removal of legal constraints on female freedom could take place. Indeed, it was considered by the feminist mainstream that recourse to law would offer an opportunity for gaining effective women’s rights. The male monopoly of the legal profession was seen as a key obstruction, and a way to preserve jobs for men, with Sachs and Wilson arguing that men ‘manifest a grudging tolerance rather than a facilitative welcome to women entrants’4. Therefore, law was being criticised for not conforming to the own high standards of equality and objectivity it claimed to uphold. Of course, it was not only a matter of personnel. There was also an established male bias in legal thinking, perhaps to be expected in an institution dominated by men, with feminists complaining that it restricted the role of women to the private sphere5. By the end of this first phase, feminists and women’